



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Die lassen, Knaben, sich entmannen  
 Von Knabenwüttrichen, die noch,  
 Die klüglichen Tyrannen!  
 Selbst tragen Vormundjoch!

Der freien Deutschen Geist, wie lange soll er sein  
 Ein Mietlingsgeist? Soll wiederkän,  
 Was andrer Fuss zertrat!"

Ramler has a passionate *Ode an die Könige* in the *Göttinger Musenalmanach* of 1772. It bears the date of 1760, and refers to the Seven Years' War.

O ihr, verderblicher, als der entbrannte  
 Vesuv, als unterirdische  
 Gewitter! Ihr, des magern Hungers Bundsverwandte,  
 Der Pest Verschworene!

Ihr Könige, wie wird es euch nicht reuen,  
 (Wo nicht die fromme Reue fleucht,  
 Durch Wohlust, falsche Weisheit, laute Schmeicheleien  
 Des Höflings weggeschleucht.)

Dass euer Stal unmenschlich Millionen  
 Urenkelsöhne niederstieß,  
 Und keiner, satt des Unglücks, seine Legionen  
 Das Blutfeld räumen hieß!

The members of the *Göttinger Hainbund* are largely indebted to Klopstock for their ideals of liberty, and for their hatred of tyranny. Voss writes to Brückner (Sept. 2, 1772), describing the celebration of Klopstock's birthday:

"Wir sprachen von Freiheit, die Hüte auf dem Kopf, von Deutschland, von Tugendgesang; du kannst denken wie! . . . mit vereinten Kräften wollen wir den Strom des Lasters und der Sklaverei aufzuhalten suchen. . . . Gott wird uns helfen, denn Freiheit und Tugend sind unsere Lösung."<sup>111</sup>

Bürger wrote his powerful lines, *Der Bauer an seinen Durchlauchtigen Tyrannen*, in the summer of 1773, half a year before the Boston Tea Party.<sup>112</sup> Voss's hatred of the nobility was based not on theories, but on bitter personal experiences.<sup>113</sup> Nor did Fritz Stolberg's inspiration come from the American Revolution. That may be seen from the fact that, as a boy, he wrote an ode to liberty (either in 1760 or, more probably, in 1766).<sup>114</sup> In the ode *Die Freiheit*, published in 1775, he says:

O Namen, Namen festlich wie Siegesklang:  
 Tell, Hermann, Klopstock, Brutus, Timoleon!

<sup>111</sup> Biedermann, *Deutschld. i. 18. Jh.*, iii, 173 f.

<sup>112</sup> Grisebach, *Bürgers Werke*, Berlin, 1894, p. xxvi.

<sup>113</sup> Herbst, *Joh. H. Voss*, Leipzig, 1872, i, 48, 111.

<sup>114</sup> Menge, *F. Stolberg*, Gotha, 1862, i, 9 n.

In his *Freiheitsgesang aus dem zwanzigsten Jahrhundert* he mentions Hermann, Tell, Luther, Klopstock. We see it is Klopstock and the old Germanic liberty, Plutarch and the heroes of antiquity that inspire him. Switzerland is to him the land of liberty.<sup>115</sup>

Let it be remembered, moreover, that previous to the American Revolution there had been a protracted struggle for popular rights in Württemberg, that Joh. Jak. Moser had spent five long years on the Hohentwiel as a martyr to Suabian liberty (1759-64).<sup>116</sup> If we add to all this the powerful influence of Rousseau, it is clear that the American Revolution had no share in producing the revolutionary spirit in German literature.<sup>117</sup> But after the American Revolution had once broken out, it was only natural that it should arouse the greatest enthusiasm among many, as it tried to project into actual life some of the ideas about which German poets were writing and dreaming.

JOHN A. WALZ.

Harvard University.

#### REMARKS ON THE CRITERIA OF USAGE, with Especial Reference to Kind of (a), Sort of (a).

As Dr. Fitzedward Hall observes in discussing the word *Reliable*, to present evidence for the availability and repute of a location is not to advocate its use; and I am no advocate of these phrases. At the same time, I am satisfied that the evidence in their favor is much more authoritative, much more cumulative and progressive, than is commonly allowed: indeed, for present and future English, their limited validity must undoubtedly be admitted. *Kind of (a)* seems to be older than *sort of (a)*, *sort of* being apparently still only or chiefly used with plurals long after *kind of (a)* had emerged, the whole class being later than the reciprocal form, *men of all kinds or sorts*. *Manner, style, type, form* and the like had presumably the same general progress, some or all of them occurring even without the geni-

<sup>115</sup> Janssen, *F. L. Stolberg*, Freiburg i. B., 1882, p. 10. Cf. also p. 377 for Stolberg's later views of America.

<sup>116</sup> A. D. B., xxii, 379-80; Scherer, *Gesch. d. dtsh. Literatur* pp. 502-3.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. also Sauer, *Die Sturm- und Drang-Periode*, p. 32, in Kürschner, *D. N. L.*, v. 79.

tive sign. Oliphant calls the use of *kind of* in Shakespeare, *T. G. V. iii, 1, 262*, "a new use of kind like the French *espèce*."

It should always be remembered that linguistic usage is neither moral nor statute law, but only a more or less variable common law: in other words, usage is a fashion whose constraints and penalties are generally analogous to those of other fashions. Some of its features are virtually indefeasible, while others are, in the life of a language, almost incidental and capricious: grammatical structure illustrates the one, vagaries of colloquialism the other. The demarcation of usage, the creation and preservation of a definitive standard of detail, is, under man's various freedoms, inconceivable: the apprehension and observance of any standards depend on the faculties of an educated taste and the substitution of that taste for personal habitudes as well as for misleading statistics, however pretentiously compiled. Nothing exhibits the freedom of man less than mathematics, and nothing exhibits it more than conduct: of the vicissitudes of conduct, fashion is the most whimsical manifestation; and fashion in language is saved from hopeless eccentricities only by the irrepressible recognition of its essential significance and by the several dependences thereby entailed. The significances of speech, being non-mathematical, are never precisely apprehended, and, by compensation, its delinquencies are never quantitatively punished: as we can never count on the revelations of speech fully realized with its contained emotion, so we have not to dread the punishment of violations distinctly forbidden and definitely assessed: we have only to anticipate losses to ourselves enforced by ourselves, analogous to those involved in other forms of conduct that do not encroach upon the rights and privileges of our neighbors.

Accordingly, no final tests of usage have even been formulated; and those who concur in the generally accepted principles consciously or unconsciously diverge in their application. Abstractly admitting the three canons of usage, ordinary speakers and writers continue to rely on the accident of habit and the chance of defence under challenge: general literarians, who patronize every collateral subject

they touch, make usage a favorite field for the confident advocacy of ignorant predilections; while professed grammarians, and especially professional rhetoricians, for the most part base their recommendations on data of very unequal and very inadequate pertinence or cogency. The first class of volunteer authorities usually deliver themselves very positively under a supposed inspiration to elevate the English of the daily press: the second group, well exemplified in the author of *Words and Their Uses*, divert real strength from creative or critical literature, for which they are equipped and adapted, to appraisements without commission: the third class show at their best in deluded discoverers who advertise a definite number of pages of a definite number of authors as the impregnable bulwarks of their self-authenticated survivals. A fourth class, consisting of one man—the late Fitzedward Hall—is enabled to pronounce on the propriety and the validity of usage by the results of exhaustive investigation, not undertaken to prove any preconceptions or even to urge any conclusions, but naturally asserting and recording and, by ready verification, resurrecting, correlating, and interpreting the characteristic features of English expression as a whole.

Obviously, the confidence inspired by a careful examination of the whole record by a man of unique competence during a lifetime of absolute devotion cannot be conceded to the reported results of special jobbing in routine by an ordinary bookmaker: we have no guarantee that such a man has chosen enough authors, the right authors, or the right portions: he is only too likely to be unobservant or to be diverted from certain phenomena towards others: he may not possess the special discriminations needed for a significant report; and his possible correctness in some details is made questionable by his evident aberration in others. Besides their meagre and arbitrary provision of data, in itself an absolute disqualification, these authorities can rarely rid themselves of an inconsistent recourse to a superficial and suicidal logic whose errors unfit them for grammatical or rhetorical functions. And, finally, a mere ratio of occurrences is at best cogent only according to the nature of the occurrences. As long as usage has un-

doubtedly licensed expressions apparently contrary to ultimate logic, a variant on an accepted locution may be provisionally validated by proving it so fully in accord with general analogies that it might have been, and may yet be, warranted as the preferred choice or one of the reputable choices, under laws that work by natural, and not by necessary, selection. This is the true recognition of genius in a language, by which it is not only what it now is but also what it is becoming. A growing idiom, however young, is not to be denounced as an outlaw or pointed at as a monster.

All that is here implied can be adduced to sustain many locutions condemned by the authorities now referred to. For example, the phrases *kind of a*, *sort of a*, exhibit a use of the article analogous to others fully accepted; this use has not even the theoretic improbability of certain pleonasm that were once allowable; and they are justified by the increasing "consentience" of modern writers; and the fact that "careful writers" do not succeed in evading them is perhaps the most forcible attestation of their claims to actual usage, however they are disclaimed by the "advent" attitude of the same writers under challenge. This contrast between usage and opinion precipitates the dilemma whether an author is authority for the usage he uses or the usage he advocates—a dilemma illustrated by Cardinal Newman's hatred and use of *is being*—a dilemma calculated to confute some windy statistics and to reverse the easy sentences of some offhand judges. Most standard writers have a very inadequate, a very misleading, or a very erroneous, account to give of their own usage and that of others, whatever be the degrees of their actual conformity to discriminating and discriminated usage; and nothing could be more entertaining than a show of these doctrinaires bound to the mouths of their own canons.

It is an adequate answer to grammarians and rhetoricians who stigmatize uses as illogical to prove that they are actual uses; but it is a satisfaction besides to expose the crudity of their reasoning. Nothing in grammar is clearer than the distinction of subject and object, as functions of the noun; yet in many tongues neuters have no subject-form, the accusative being used also as a nominative. Indicative and subjunctive are distinguished as actual and

potential; yet even in the same tongue each mood is at times used for the other, and there is only a superficial similarity in the modal uses of different tongues. *I spent no more than I could help*, seems to mean *than I could not help*; and *I cannot but try*, is interchangeable with *I can but try*, as is *ever so* with *never so*. Even a double negative is illogical only on questionable premises: in general grammar, it is not the application of two negatives to the same assertion that implies offset, but only the direct application of one negative to the other. To condemn a collocation as illogical simply by assessing the combination of its individual terms under the conception of a period different from that of its composition is a confusion of standards at wide variance with any reassuring logic. Logic is only consistency: consistency depends on original significance and content as compared with exposed or converted content; and no established collocation can, merely by its present suggestions, be fairly judged as radically illogical, though such suggestions have often been urged as reasons for the retirement of a superfluous veteran. A capital instance of survival is *not at all*, which ought to mean *somewhat* but does mean *altogether not*: with it we may compare *I don't think so*, *I never remember*, and *all that glitters is not gold*.

In the phrases *kind of a*, *sort of a*, the appearance of *a* is not illogical by any final test: if it were, other appearances of this article would equally discredit themselves, as they do not. We cite: "fruit called (an) orange:" "catch (a) cold:" "becomes (a) general:" "rascal of (a) boy:" "reputation of (a) witch:" "form of (an) association:" "in the nature of (a) chaplain:" "something of (a) humorist:" "the theory of (a) husband:" "but (a) very little impression:" "the character of (an) old fellow:" "a bit of (a) poet:" "the part of (a) man:" "fine figure of (a) man:" "more of (a) man:" "shadow of (a) chance:" "show of (a) case:" "type of (an) adventurer:" "in the way of (a) special:" "oh! for (a) shame:" "a better husband than (a) friend." Many of these intrusive articles go very far back in the history of English: \* on the other hand, some

\* It should perhaps be noted that Prof. Einkenel has recently traced the introduction from the French of the indispensable idiom by which one may boast of being 'a devil of a fellow.' See *An English Miscellany* (Furnivall Memorial Volume), p. 68, and *Anglia Beiblatt*, xii, 61. J. W. B.

of them can be explained as true individualizers and not as due to mere interchanges of position or to duplication of construction.

I have made no ratio of usage in these locutions, nor have I any complete record for any author or work. I have no sympathy with the physiology that interprets temperament from relative blushes and pallors, numerically noted on a given occasion or on several given occasions, unless the degrees of cause and effect in each motive, emotion, and circulation be measured, unless the occasions be established as fully typical, unless conscious effort to express, repress, or suppress be assessed, unless habit, tendency or condition, regardless of special stimulus, be allowed for. A writer's habit, however unintelligent, is indeed some contribution to the fact of actual usage; but any given writer's habit, if conscious or conventional, is no contribution to the essential theory of that usage; and his general "carefulness" in the mechanical observance of automatic formulæ is not to be urged to attest the validity of these formulæ as against other locutions not to his taste or outside of his procedure. The fact that such writers are almost certain at times to use variant expressions establishes the progress of such variants; and their use proximately proves the writer's inability to differentiate the expressions in argument, when his irregularity is called to his attention. Thus the inadequacy of statistics is at once brought into question: the man who hesitates is lost; and the conscious or unconscious licenser, whose variations, once begun, grow with his productions, distributes himself proportionately amongst the various sides till he breaks down the force of his evidence for any as against the others; nor has the ratio of occurrences any cogent significance without impossible assessment of the period and the circumstances. The special exercise of conscious "carefulness" may retard or revise the natural use of expressions towards which he has been growing: a few occurrences in his later writings, as compared with many of the other form in his earlier work, would clearly show his tendency toward the newer fashion; and, in any case, one variation without readiness to resist or power to explain weakens his testimony on the

point. Furthermore, the cumulative testimony of literature for a given locution is not nearly so strong in the number of relative occurrences in any given author as in the diffusion of it amongst writers in general—a test analogous to the influence of every social fashion, in accordance with which people generally will on a certain occasion do that for which the special occasion will not frequently arise in the case of any individual. Therefore, a complete record of any current author of standard excellence would be at once inadequate and superfluous; and to attempt a statistic of all would be overwhelming. I risk nothing in saying that all the writers of today that are otherwise classed as the best exhibit evidences of growth in *kind of a, sort of a*, and that not one even of the "careful" writers evades these phrases, if his expression in extent and in style suggests their use. There are, indeed, other ways to express the notions—as by the indefinite article alone and by the indefinite pronouns—but, as a general thing, where our phrases would naturally occur, the other phraseology is apt to seem an over-conscious deviation or correction; and such instances are not in point, because mere predilection or stylistic preference cannot affect the ultimate grounds of correctness in natural collocations that are personally disfavored or abandoned. Small importance, then, is to be attached to the habit of any writer, if that writer can be proved guilty of recognized lapses, lapses defended as some great writers have defended unquestionable vulgarisms of their own. Finally, those who wish to satisfy themselves how far the most confident grammarians and rhetoricians are competent as historians or logicians can test their doctrines on the English subjunctive either by the theory or by the practice of English writers, including the grammarians and rhetoricians themselves; and they can verify the ordinary teaching of these authorities on the "universal present," a form of assertion which in natural English rarely conforms to the instruction of the doctors. Such investigation will disclose a parrotting chorus of error, their philosophy of the subjunctive being neither philosophy nor usage, and the utmost truth in the other doctrine being the persistence of a few stock expres-

sions. Linguistic fates are scornful, and it would be cruel to cite illustrations: on the other hand, it is a consoling reflection that the truly great masters are the least dogmatic, and freely yield to the influence of locutions condemned—and used—by their subalterns. These masters either themselves use these locutions or, without stigma, cite them and others even stranger to present analogy.

The examples already cited seem sufficient to establish a theoretic basis for the use of the article involved in the phrases; and their practical growth is easily exemplified by modern authors, any list of whom is a list of authorities for the phrases. It is not at all true, though commonly taught, that the indefinite article points out an individual member of a class, except in a sense that makes such individual a concentrated representative of the class; and, as singular and plural are only different aspects of the object in reference to divisibility, such individualization is of no moment whatever. Every indefinite, as applying to no one object in particular, implies necessarily a plurality of reference: hence, the indefinite article, whatever be its special uses, cannot essentially limit its noun to a concrete individual. Moreover, the essence of the abstract idea is that common factor of characteristics that is necessarily and by definition a unit or an identity: yet the abstract noun, so far as it is truly abstract, does not permit the indefinite article even in tongues where it requires the definite article. Indeed either article and no article at all may exhibit the generic sense; just as *any* may mean *every*, and may take a plural correlation either in pronouns or in comparisons. The objection to *kind of a man* applies equally to *kind of man*, so far as the number of *man* is concerned; and it has already been shown not to apply at all to either combination: grammatically, *a people*, *the people*, *this people*, *these people* are equally singular and equally plural: *a gallows* is a reciprocal to *these kind*, without reference to the contextual relations of the latter: *a few* is as plural as *few*; and we even say *this kind of one*.

While, generally speaking, the articular and unarticular forms are used interchangeably, so far as I know attention has never been called to the fact that the articular form is never used unless the phrase when converted permits the article: thus we say *this kind of a book*, be-

cause we can convert into *a book of this kind*; but we do not say *this kind of a weather*. As commonly used, *kind of* does not permit *the* before the following noun, because it is an approximating term; but, when used as designating strictly a class or category, *the* is pertinent, as Lamb might have said "the prettier the kind of *the* thing is," where he did say *a*. As already indicated, the presence of the article intensifies the indefiniteness, and it is particularly suited to emphasize approximation or resemblance; though this intensification cannot, of course, extend to the colloquialism exhibited in *kind of sad*, an Americanism beginning to appear in English books.

Any ultimate grounds for the exclusion of the indefinite article from these phrases would need support from general grammar; but general grammar has no such support to give: in nothing do various languages show their genius more than in their articular idiosyncrasies, and the historic periods of any one language show almost equal inconsistency. Evidently the phrases in question are now in for their day; and remonstrance or deprecation, however well-founded, cannot alter facts. Regardless of statistics, I believe the facts to be as I have stated them; and I prefer the endeavor to establish conclusions by the interpretation of characteristic features rather than by a computation of items. The mistaken reliance on statistical methods, as it seems to me, is only too evidently undermining the meditative and emotional study of all phenomena; and the substitution of statistics for sympathy and imagination is not only obscuring the impulses of interpretation but actually displacing the ordinary applications of common sense. Language and literature in particular are suffering fatally from this supersedure; for it is the peculiar aspiration of this age of evaporated sensibility to display its feelings in schemes and analyses. An age of statistics develops enterprises of great moment, but not of great pith, numerous talents but no comprehensive genius, figures of gigantic proportions but void of character: it counts what it can, but never misses what it eliminates: it substitutes calculation for interpretation, and is not even aware that security of computation is not the joy of appreciation.

CASKIE HARRISON.

Brooklyn.